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Abstract—State estimation is of considerable significance for
the power system operation and control. However, well-designed
false data injection attacks can utilize blind spots in conventional
residual-based bad data detection methods to manipulate mea-
surements in a coordinated manner and thus affect the secure
operation and economic dispatch of grids. In this paper, we
propose a detection approach based on an autoencoder neural
network. By training the network on the dependencies intrinsic
in normal operation data, it effectively overcomes the challenge
of unbalanced training data that is inherent in power system
attack detection. To evaluate the detection performance of the
proposed mechanism, we conduct a series of experiments on
the IEEE 118-bus power system. The experiments demonstrate
that the proposed autoencoder detector displays robust detection
performance under a variety of attack scenarios.
Index Terms—Anomaly detection, autoencoder, false data in-
jection attack, unbalanced training data, machine learning.
I. INTRODUCTION
The power system is increasingly equipped with sensors
and communication infrastructures. This enables smarter grid
operations, but also makes possible novel cyber attack sce-
narios that manipulate power system measurements instead of
directly disrupting ICT infrastructure or stealing valuable data.
Although the typical bad data detection (BDD) within state
estimation (SE) can detect erroneous measurements and some
basic attacks, well-designed attacks can remain stealthy and
bypass the BDD, such as the stealthy false data injection at-
tacks (FDIAs) [1]. These stealthy measurements manipulation
attacks severely threaten both the economic dispatching and
security control of the power system [2], [3].
Several techniques have been proposed to deal with stealthy
FDIAs. In [4], the authors have proposed a Kalman filter
estimator together with a chi-square detector. Other statistical
methods, such as sequential detection using Cumulative Sum
(CUSUM)-type algorithms were designed in [5]. The recent
work [6] has proposed a detector utilizing the statistical
consistency of measurements, presuming that the system is
observable by a minimal set of secure phasor measurement
units. These methods, however, can be limited by the prior
This work is supported by the Chinese Scholarship Council.
assumption that measurements fit specific distributions, or by
restrictions on the number of manipulated measurements [7].
Moreover, it is increasingly recognised that the distribution
of normal power system states is not easily characterised using
standard parametric distributions [8]. The need to operate in a
complex stochastic environment has led to the deployment of
data-driven methods. For example, distance-based algorithms
like k nearest neighbour (k-NN) were used to cluster normal
and corrupted measurement states [9]. Nevertheless, the very
high dimensionality of measurements (from the physical,
cyber and market domains) results in data sparsity, where
manipulated measurements may be masked by the noise of
multiple irrelevant dimensions. This can make detection using
a high-dimensional distance-based algorithm computationally
inefficient or even invalid [10].
Alternative data-driven approaches to FDIA detection have
been proposed in the form of support-vector machine (SVM)-
based classifiers [11] and deep neural network-based classi-
fiers [12]. Both are supervised machine learning algorithms
that classify measurements into normal and manipulated data
on the basis of labeled training data. However, due to the
infrequent occurrence (or more likely: absence) of FDIAs in
historical data, the training data set is highly unbalanced,
so that it must be augmented by simulated training data.
Moreover, in this way, the detector only learns to detect known
attacks, which is a significant weakness in a fast-evolving field
with resourceful and potentially well-equipped attackers.
This paper bridges the identified gap by proposing a detec-
tion approach based on an autoencoder neural network. The
main contributions of this paper are listed below:
1) We propose an autoencoder-based detection approach for
FDIAs. It learns to identify anomalous system states
(and therefore possible attacks) using only SCADA-type
power flow measurements for a large range of normal
operating conditions. Therefore it is well-suited to the
inherent data imbalance in FDIA detection applications.
2) We define a case study on the IEEE 118-bus system,
including a model to generate ‘normal’ data. We for-
mulate two FDIA scenarios by considering comprehen-
sive factors of the adversaries purpose, capacity, and
knowledge and utilize indicators to evaluate the FDIA
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detection performance of our proposed mechanism. The
experimental results demonstrate the mechanism has a
satisfactory detection accuracy.
II. STATE ESTIMATION AND DATA ATTACKS
In this section, we briefly review the state estimation and
bad data detection technique and formulate the FDIA problem.
A. State estimation
The power system we consider has nb buses and nt trans-
mission lines. The vector θ = [θ1, θ2, . . . , θnb ]
T represents
nb phase angles, excluding the angle of the reference bus. In
this paper, a DC power flow model is assumed, in which the
reactive power is neglected and bus voltages are assumed to
be 1 (p.u.). The vector P I ∈ Rnb of active power injections
is related to the angle vector θ,
P I = APF = AR−1AT θ, (1)
where PF ∈ Rnt is the branch active power flow vector, R ∈
Rnt×nt is a diagonal matrix of transmission line reactances and
A ∈ Rnb×nt is the branch-to-node incidence matrix [13]. In
the following, we shall use the power injection vector P I as
the system state x ∈ Rnb . It is functionally equivalent to the
more commonly used phase angle vector θ, but it allows for
more elegant generation and detection of FDIAs.
We consider a system where the active power injections
and line flows are measured with some error. Thus the system
model H ∈ R(nb+nt)×nb for measurement and state can be
written by
z =
[
I
HF
]
x+ e = Hx+ e, (2)
where the measurement noise vector e ∼ N (0, D) denotes m
independent zero-mean Gaussian variables with the covariance
matrix D = diag(δ21 , . . . , δ
2
m) and the measurement vector
z ∈ Rm indicates measured power injection and line power
flow with noise. Identity matrix I ∈ Rnb×nb and distribution
factor matrix HF ∈ Rnt×nb are parts in H corresponding
to the power injection and line power flow, respectively. Ac-
cording to (1), the distribution factor matrix can be described
as HF = R−1AT (AR−1AT )−1. Given the observation of the
measurements z, the state estimate xˆ is solved by the weighted
least squares (WLS) approach [14] as
xˆ = (HTD−1H)−1HTD−1z := Kz. (3)
B. Bad data detection and stealth FDIAs
The vector xˆ is then utilized to estimate the power injection
and line power flow measurements by zˆ = Hxˆ. In bad
data detection, a residual is defined to describe the difference
between the actual and the estimated measurements, namely
ro = z − zˆ. This naturally gives rise to a BDD scheme that
identifies bad data by comparing the 2-norm of ro with a
certain threshold τ , i.e. an alarm is triggered if ‖ro‖2 > τ .
We denote a ∈ Rm as the non-zero false data vector injected
into measurement vector z. The manipulated measurement
vector can be described as za = z + a. Here the vector c
is defined as the deviation of the estimated state before and
after the attack. The corrupted system state can be denoted as
xˆa = xˆ + c. According to (3), the falsified state estimate xˆa
can be written by
xˆa = (H
TD−1H)−1HTD−1za
= (HTD−1H)−1HTD−1(z + a) (4)
= xˆ+ c,
and the corresponding ra after the attack can be expressed as
ra = za −Hxˆa = z + a−H(xˆ+ c)
= ro + (a−Hc). (5)
If a = Hc, then the manipulated residual ra equals the original
residual ro. Thus the attacker manipulates the measurements
with the residual unchanged and keeps stealthy with respect to
this physics-based BDD scheme. This remains true if a 6= Hc,
as long as ‖ra‖2 ≤ τ is still satisfied.
For our FDIA detection study, we consider one attack
scenario from the perspective of an adversary that manipulates
load patterns [3], for example in order to hide excessive power
consumption or to reduce apparent power consumption for
economic motives. The adversary needs to corrupt the power
generation and power flow accordingly to avoid detection by
BDD. The attack scenario will be detailed in section IV.
III. FDIA DETECTION MECHANISM
In this section, we propose an FDIA detection mechanism
based on the autoencoder algorithm. We first analyze the
specific characteristics and advantages of the method for
identifying FDIAs in the context of the power system. Then,
we explain the attack detection principle of the autoencoder-
based mechanism in detail. Finally, we describe the complete
training and detection process of our proposed mechanism.
A. Autoencoder-based attack detector
FDIA detection is essentially a classification problem with
the objective of distinguishing false data from data that is
considered normal. What the SVM-based [11] and deep neural
network-based classifiers [12] have in common is to treat
FDIA detection as a supervised learning task. However, super-
vised learning requires a training data set with representative
examples of normal system operation and attacks. Such data
sets are in short supply, because of the rarity of attacks,
unwillingness to share data, and evolving attacks. As a result,
it is difficult to learn a satisfactory discriminator of normal
and attack scenarios on this basis [15].
Instead, we propose to approach FDIA detection as a one-
class classification problem, where the detector is trained on
examples of only normal operation data. Observations with
features that deviate substantially from those in the training
data will be considered anomalies, in this case as potential
attacks. There are two main advantages to this approach. First,
the autoencoder-based mechanism avoids the need to gather or
generate attack data to create balanced data sets for training
the classifiers. Second, by focusing on what is normal only,
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Fig. 1. The schematic of the Autoencoder.
the proposed mechanism is naturally prepared for unknown
attack patterns.
Autoencoders learn the most important features of the
training data (i.e. normal power system measurements) by
sending the measurements through an information bottleneck
while attempting to reconstruct the training data with min-
imal error [16]. The structure of the autoencoder algorithm
is depicted in Fig. 1. The dimension reduction process of
mapping the d0-dimensional input data to the code in the
bottleneck layer B through hidden layers H1 to Hn is named
the encoder. Afterwards, the decoder decompresses the code
to d0-dimensional output data. Weight matrices W and bias
vectors b are utilized in the encoding and decoding process as
Y = σ(W en(. . . σ(W
e
0Z + b
e
0) . . .) + b
e
n) , (6a)
Zˆ = σ(W dn(. . . σ(W
d
0 Y + b
d
0) . . .) + b
d
n) , (6b)
where W en and W
d
n denote weight matrices for encoding and
decoding process respectively, ben and b
d
n are bias vectors, and
σ represents a nonlinear element-wise activation function. Z
refers to the input data vector, Y is the data in the bottleneck
layer and vector Zˆ stands for the output data.
B. Training and detection process
The residual associated with a training observation Zj is
given by rj = Zj − Zˆj . The reconstruction error Rj is
expressed as the ratio of the length of rj to the input data
dimension d0 and the objective of the training process is to
minimize the mean value of the sum of all reconstruction
errors Rj as
min
W, b
{
J := 1S
S∑
1
(‖rj‖2/d0)
}
, (7)
where S denotes the total number of the observations used for
training. By training the autoencoder on training data that is
considered normal, it learns to efficiently encode the features
of this data in the bottleneck layer B. Data that deviates from
the training data in a structural way is therefore highly likely
to have a larger reconstruction error.
The training and FDIA detection process of the proposed
mechanism is depicted in Fig. 2. In the training stage, the
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Fig. 2. The proposed training and FDIA detection mechanism.
algorithm iteratively updates the value of weight matrices W
and bias vectors b until the function J converges. At the end
of the training process, the reconstruction errors Rj for the
validation set are sorted in ascending order. A threshold τα
equals to the αth percentile is then chosen, for example at the
value where an inflection point occurs in the error distribution.
A possible FDIA is detected when, for a measurement Zj in
the test set, the reconstruction error Rj exceeds the threshold
τα.
IV. CASE STUDY
In this section, we evaluate the detection performance of the
proposed mechanism using a case study on the IEEE 118-bus
system. First, we describe the process of modelling normal op-
erating conditions and explain how to create anomalous attack
scenarios. Then, we describe and analyse the load-targeted
attack scenario. For this scenarios, we will first quantify the
detection performance of our proposed detection mechanism.
Specifically, the detection probability, false positive rate, false
negative rate are tested. Next, the detection performance of
our detector will be compared with a conventional BDD
detector. To do so, we introduce knowledge limited attacks that
both detectors can potentially detect. Notably, the knowledge-
limited attacks are more of interest in reality as the attacker
may have an inaccurate (e.g. out-dated or estimated) system
model.
A. Modeling normal operating conditions
With the long-term secure and stable operation, the power
system has a large number of normal operating conditions
which involve a significant volume of loads, power generations
and power flows data set. Trained by these data, the proposed
mechanism will acquire the data pattern which represents the
model of normal system operating conditions.
In the IEEE 118-bus system, electricity is supplied by
M = 54 generators, transmitted via Q = 186 branches
and ultimately consumed by N = 99 loads. We generate
‘normal’ (i.e. physically feasible and economically reasonable)
power system states and corresponding measurements by using
optimal power flow solutions.
Second order polynomial cost functions were assumed for
generators, i.e., f(PGg ) = Cg,2(P
G
g )
2 + Cg,1P
G
g . Hence
the economic dispatch PG
∗
is solved with the objective to
minimize the total generation cost. The solutions are implicitly
parameterized by the nodal load PLl and generation cost
parameter as
PG
∗
= arg min
PG
M∑
g=1
Cg,2(P
G
g )
2 + Cg,1P
G
g (8)
s.t.
M∑
g=1
PGg −
N∑
l=1
PLl = 0,
where the injection P I = P I(PG, PL) is determined by the
mapping of load PL and generation PG onto the nodes.
Normal operating conditions are generated using a data set
that contains a total of 43,717 historical hourly loads from
32 European countries between 2013 and 2017 [17]. These
time series were used to generate a 99 load point time series
as follows. The national load time series are first divided by
1000, to obtain reasonable magnitudes for individual buses.
Then each load point is assigned a random linear combination
of the 32 sources by sampling from the Dirichlet distribution
with vector valued parameter (1, . . . , 1)T , which generates
a uniform distribution on the 31-simplex. Additionally, a
normally distributed variation with a standard deviation of
±5% of the measured value is added to each measurement.
An additional source of randomness was created by ran-
domly sampling the generating cost coefficients of the 54 gen-
erators as follows. Coefficients Cg,2 were sampled uniformly
in the range [0.085, 0.1225] $/MWh2 and Cg,1 uniformly
in the range [1, 5] $/MWh. These values span the range of
generators included in the IEEE 9-bus system supplied with
Matpower [18].
The procedure above was used to generate snapshot injec-
tions P I = P I(PG
∗
, PL), which were converted into line flow
measurements using PF = HFP I . In this investigation, line
transmission limits and generator capacities are not enforced,
as the focus of this work is on the recognition of load,
generation and power flow patterns. This results in a 339-
dimensional measurement vector for training, containing 99,
54 and 186-dimensional data of loads, power generations
and line power flows, respectively. Independent measurement
noise e is added using a truncated Gaussian distribution with
zero mean, standard deviation of 0.33% and an absolute
value less than 1% of the original value [19]. The generated
data set T ∈ R43717×339 was divided into a training set
Tr ∈ R26197×339, a validation set Tv ∈ R8760×339 and testing
set Te ∈ R8760×339.
In this paper, the autoencoder network contains 4 hidden
layers in the encoder with dimensions of 339, 256, 128 and
64, respectively. The bottleneck layer has 32 nodes, and the
decoder maps the 32-dimensional data to a 339-dimensional
output through 3 hidden layers with the same dimensions as
the encoder. In this paper, we used the sigmoid activation
function between the second and penultimate hidden layer and
the Adam Optimizer [20] to iteratively optimize the value
of weight matrices W and bias vectors b. The batch size
and learning rate for training was 256 and 10−5 respectively
and 2000 training epochs were used. Training and testing
of the autoencoder was conducted using tensorflow on
the Google Colab environment using the GPU option. An
initial performance analysis of hyperparameter settings for the
autoencoder-based FDIA detector is available in [21].
B. Creating attack scenarios
We develop feasible FDIAs from the perspective of the
adversaries by adding an offset to the normal operating condi-
tions created in the previous section. To gain economic profit,
attackers inject false data into the grid by using the acquired
knowledge of the targeted power system. In the context of this
paper, this knowledge is represented by the incidence matrix
A (topology) and the reactance matrix R of the transmission
lines. Moreover, we assume that the capacity of an attacker
is limited by the attackable measurement set [1] and the
maximum number of the measurements that the attacker can
corrupt simultaneously.
In the following, we quantify the factors described above.
According to the attack capacity, the adversary selects a set
of attacked loads LA ⊆ L. The attacker then determines
the change rate βl of each selected load and calculates the
total load change
∑
l∈LA βlP
L
l , in which βlP
L
l equals the
change ∆PLl of each load. Similarly, the attack selects a set of
attacked generators GA ⊆ G. Next, the attack determines ratios
of the power generatings change amount λ1 : λ2 : . . . : λ|GA|
and normalizes the ratios to get the power generations change
∆PGg . Here |GA| represents the cardinality of GA.
∆PGg =
[∑
l∈LA
βlP
L
l
]
× λg∑
g′∈GA λg′
(9a)
All load changes ∆PLl and generation changes ∆P
G
g , together
with zeros that denote buses with unchanged injection make
up the power injection change vector ∆P IA ∈ R118. Besides,
similar to (2), the attacker then utilizes the knowledge of the
topology and grid parameters to coordinately calculate power
flows change vector ∆PFA ∈ R186.
∆PFA = H
F ·∆P IA, (9b)
Afterwards, the attack vector a consists of the change vector
of loads, power generations and line power flows.
The FDIA manipulates the original data of loads, power
generations and line power flows. The pattern of the corrupted
data may deviate from that of normal operating conditions,
which enables it to be detected by the autoencoder if the
reconstruction error Rj exceeds τα.
C. Load-targeted attack for economic profit
1) Detection effectiveness validation: We first validate the
effectiveness of the trained detector. In this experiment, we
observe the change of the reconstruction error Rj before and
after a false data injection attack and compare it with the
threshold τα. A common scenario for an attack happens when
the adversary gets the data of a local area and utilizes it to
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Fig. 3. Detection effectiveness validation by launching an FDIA.
manipulate the neighboring measurements. Here, we select 12
hours operating data from 9:00 to 20:00 on December 31st,
2017 as an example. Assuming the attacker gets the three loads
profile of bus 108, 109, 110, at 14:00, to gain economic profit,
an attack is launched by injecting false data to decrease the
power demand of the loads by 10% as −7.48 MW, −5.69 MW
and −6.28 MW respectively. Accordingly, to balance the
power of loads and generations, the attacker decreases the
nearby power injection of two generators connected to bus
number 110 and 111 with the ratio λ1 : λ2 = 1. Based on (9b),
the corresponding transmission line power flows are obtained.
The experiment result is depicted in Fig. 3.
From the result, we can observe that before the attack,
the reconstruction error Rj of normal operating data is in
the range of 3.10 × 10−4 and 5.60 × 10−4, and they are
lower than the threshold τ97% = 7.25 × 10−4 learned in the
training process shown in the subsection B of Section III. To be
specific, after observing the reconstruction error distribution of
the validation data, the threshold is set as 97th percentile due
to the occurrence of the inflection point where the cumulative
distribution curve of the reconstruction error flattens out from
the steep rise. After manipulation by the false data injection,
the reconstruction error Rj at 14:00 increases from 4.40×10−4
to 7.53×10−4, which exceeds the threshold τ97% and triggers
an alarm. The detector thus recognizes an anomaly in the
corrupted measurements, which deviate from measurements
taken in normal operating conditions. This result demonstrates
that the autoencoder is capable of FDIA detection in at least
some scenarios.
2) General detection performance: In addition to the one-
off effectiveness demonstrated above, we are also interested
in its statistical detection performance. This is tested by
launching a larger number of FDIAs at various times and
with various false load data injection magnitudes. Here the
magnitude is defined as the percentage of load reduction in
targeted nodes. For the sake of comparison, the attack targets
remained the same as these utilized in the last experiment. In
this experiment, we launch an attack at 2:00, 14:00 and 21:00
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Fig. 4. Detection probability of attacks at different time with different false
load data injection magnitude.
in each day of 2017 by reducing reported loads between 1% to
30% and observing the detection performance. The detection
probability is the ratio of detected attacks to all the launched
attacks, namely the true positive rate. The results are shown
in Fig. 4.
Because the load demands at 2:00, 14:00 and 21:00 differ
significantly, the resulting power system states (including
flows) are also substantially different. However, the result
shows, under the same false load injection magnitude, the
detection probabilities differ only slightly. This demonstrates
that the autoencoder learns the intrinsic relationship of the
loads, power generations and power flows from different
operating conditions, leading to robust detection results.
In addition, we launch 8760 attacks, one for each hour of
2017, by decreasing the power demand of the same buses by
15%. Besides, we use the hourly normal operating data in
2017 as a control group. The result is shown in Table I.
TABLE I
DETECTION PERFORMANCE EVALUATION.
Normal Data Attack Data
True Negative 96.5% (8453) True Positive 93.6% (8199)
False Positive 3.5% (307) False Negetive 6.4% (561)
From the experiment result, we can find that the detection
probability (true positive rate) is 93.6%, which denotes a
satisfactory detection performance. As mentioned in the first
experiment, the threshold τ97% was used, corresponding to
a 3% misclassification rate in the validation set. It is worth
noting that the false positive rate is comparable to the 3.5%
observed in Table I. This result suggests that the autoencoder
has a good generalization capability and does not overfit.
3) Detection performance comparison: In the above experi-
ments, our proposed autoencoder-based detector has succeeded
in generating a diagnosis signal in the presence of FDIAs
which can keep stealthy from the viewpoint of BDD. In
the second experiment, we compare our detector with BDD
in detection of ‘unstealthy’ FDIAs. Such attacks have the
Fig. 5. Detection performance comparison between the proposed mechanism
and the BDD scheme in load-targeted attack scenario.
possibility to be detected by the BDD while the detectability
is intimately related to the topology or parameter errors in the
construction of FDIAs by the attacker. Thus in what follows
there exist knowledge deviations in the system model acquired
by the attacker in computing the attack vector of (9). In
particular, we explore the case that the attacker knows the
exact topology of the network but inaccurate line reactance R
in (1). This can be described by
Rˆ = R · (IR + γ), (10)
where IR ∈ Rnt×nt is the identity matrix and γ ∈ Rnt×nt
is a diagonal matrix whose elements denote the reactance
deviation ratio - which we will refer to as the knowledge
deviation ratio. In this experiment, we range the magnitude
of the deviations from 0.01 to 0.20, with randomly sampled
signs for each element. According to the explanation of (2),
this will lead to an erroneous distribution factor matrix HF and
thus obtain inaccurate power flow values. We keep the attack
target unchanged from the previous experiments and set the
false load data injection magnitude on the selected three loads
by decreasing them by 15%. The results are shown in Fig. 5.
As the level of knowledge deviation increases from ±1% to
±20%, the detection probability of BDD rises from 0.038 to
0.548, but it remains lower than the detection performance of
the autoencoder.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose an FDIA detection mechanism
based on an autoencoder neural network. The main contri-
bution is that, distinct from existing approaches, the approach
learns the internal dependency of normal operation data, which
avoids the need for gathering or generating attack data for
training the classifiers and thus effectively overcomes the in-
herent unbalanced training data set challenge in power system.
The results demonstrate that the mechanism is able to robustly
detect stealthy FDIAs. Moreover, it still outperforms a BDD
scheme when the attacker has only approximate knowledge of
the network parameters.
In future work, we aim to extend the method to analyze
temporal signatures and to include contextual information.
REFERENCES
[1] Y. Liu, P. Ning, and M. K. Reiter, “False data injection attacks against
state estimation in electric power grids,” ACM Transactions on Informa-
tion and System Security (TISSEC), vol. 14, no. 1, p. 13, 2011.
[2] R. Liu, C. Vellaithurai, S. S. Biswas, T. T. Gamage, and A. K. Srivastava,
“Analyzing the cyber-physical impact of cyber events on the power grid,”
IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid, vol. 6, no. 5, pp. 2444–2453, 2015.
[3] L. Jia, J. Kim, R. J. Thomas, and L. Tong, “Impact of data quality
on real-time locational marginal price,” IEEE Transactions on Power
Systems, vol. 29, no. 2, pp. 627–636, 2013.
[4] K. Manandhar, X. Cao, F. Hu, and Y. Liu, “Detection of faults and
attacks including false data injection attack in smart grid using kalman
filter,” IEEE transactions on control of network systems, vol. 1, no. 4,
pp. 370–379, 2014.
[5] S. Li, Y. Yılmaz, and X. Wang, “Quickest detection of false data
injection attack in wide-area smart grids,” IEEE Transactions on Smart
Grid, vol. 6, no. 6, pp. 2725–2735, 2015.
[6] J. Zhao, L. Mili, and M. Wang, “A generalized false data injection attacks
against power system nonlinear state estimator and countermeasures,”
IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, p. 1, 2018.
[7] K. Pan, P. Palensky, and P. M. Esfahani, “From static to dynamic
anomaly detection with application to power system cyber security,”
IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, pp. 1–1, 2019.
[8] M. Sun, I. Konstantelos, S. Tindemans, and G. Strbac, “Evaluating com-
posite approaches to modelling high-dimensional stochastic variables
in power systems,” in 2016 Power Systems Computation Conference
(PSCC). IEEE, 2016, pp. 1–8.
[9] J. Tian, M. H. Azarian, and M. Pecht, “Anomaly detection using self-
organizing maps-based k-nearest neighbor algorithm,” in Proceedings of
the European Conference of the Prognostics and Health Management
Society. Citeseer, 2014.
[10] C. C. Aggarwal, “Outlier analysis,” in Data mining. Springer, 2015,
pp. 237–263.
[11] Y. He, G. J. Mendis, and J. Wei, “Real-time detection of false data
injection attacks in smart grid: A deep learning-based intelligent mech-
anism,” IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid, vol. 8, no. 5, pp. 2505–2516,
2017.
[12] J. James, Y. Hou, and V. O. Li, “Online false data injection attack
detection with wavelet transform and deep neural networks,” IEEE
Transactions on Industrial Informatics, vol. 14, no. 7, pp. 3271–3280,
2018.
[13] F. M. Gonzalez-Longatt and J. L. Rueda, PowerFactory applications for
power system analysis. Springer, 2014.
[14] H. Sandberg, A. Teixeira, and K. H. Johansson, “On security indices
for state estimators in power networks,” in First Workshop on Secure
Control Systems (SCS), Stockholm, 2010.
[15] L. Duan, M. Xie, T. Bai, and J. Wang, “A new support vector data
description method for machinery fault diagnosis with unbalanced
datasets,” Expert Systems with Applications, vol. 64, pp. 239–246, 2016.
[16] M. Sakurada and T. Yairi, “Anomaly detection using autoencoders with
nonlinear dimensionality reduction,” in Proceedings of the MLSDA 2014
2nd Workshop on Machine Learning for Sensory Data Analysis. ACM,
2014, p. 4.
[17] J. Muehlenpfordt, “Time series,” Open Power System Data, 2019.
[Online]. Available: https://data.open-power-system-data.org/timeseries/
2019-06-05
[18] R. D. Zimmerman, C. E. Murillo-Sa´nchez, and D. Gan, “Matpower:
A matlab power system simulation package,” Manual, Power Systems
Engineering Research Center, Ithaca NY, vol. 1, 1997.
[19] M. He, V. Vittal, and J. Zhang, “Online dynamic security assessment
with missing pmu measurements: A data mining approach,” IEEE
Transactions on Power Systems, vol. 28, no. 2, pp. 1969–1977, 2013.
[20] D. P. Kingma and J. Ba, “Adam: A method for stochastic optimization,”
arXiv preprint arXiv:1412.6980, 2014.
[21] C. Wang, K. Pan, S. Tindemans, and P. Palensky, “Training strategies for
autoencoder-based detection of false data injection attacks,” in The 2020
IEEE PES Innovative Smart Grid Technologies Europe (ISGT Europe
2020), 2020, arXiv:2005.07158.
